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The article aims to supplement traditional explanations of why performing arts institutions 
tend to run a deficit. The case of early music ensembles shows that the traditionally cited 
mechanisms do not suffice to explain why these institutions catch Baumol’s “cost disease.” 
Baumol’s model may be supplemented by another, based on two related hypotheses: the 
deepening deficit of early music ensembles is related to their going professional and is due to 
the fact that they are simultaneously competing with subsidized or-chestras on two markets: 
the concert market and the labor market for musicians.
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1. Introduction
Cultural economics got started by tackling the problem of what causes the chronic deficit
characteristic of performing arts companies: how were we to understand the fact that organiza-
tions devoted to putting on live performances seemed condemned not to be able to pay for
themselves?1 Few of the models proposed by either economists (Baumol and Bowen, 1966;
Frey and Pommerehne, 1993) or sociologists (Di Maggio, 1986) to account for what clearly☆ This article was published originally in French and appeared in Sociologie du Travail (Sociol. Trav.) 46 (2004)
477-495. It has been translated by Amy Jacobs.
E-mail address: p.francois@cso.cnrs.fr (P. François).
1 The London theater managed by Handel went bankrupt twice in 15 years—cost disease seems as old as the per-
forming arts themselves.
seems an inevitability have been based on real development of a new art world, one that
would have allowed the researchers to study in vivo the mechanisms by which performing arts
institutions “catch” cost disease. The development of early music ensembles in France since
the 1970s offers just such a case: a new art world developed in a relatively short time. Musi-
cians worked to unearth a repertoire that in many cases had been forgotten for centuries, and
to follow the rules for performing these works in effect at the time they were composed. These
interpretive principles were practiced in France by ensembles of a sort to be found nowhere
else in the world of serious music. The fact is that 25 years later, they too all have cost dis-
ease. The only way they have been able to develop despite their deficit has been to find pa-
trons and subsidies; those that could not manage this have disappeared.2 As shown in Table 1,
none of the main early music ensembles is able to finance its activity; all need subsidizing of
one kind or another to survive.
From the table it can readily be calculated that public subsidies account for an average of
32% of early music ensemble resources—one-third the proportion for traditional institutions—
while ensemble receipts represent on average 61% of their budgets, an extremely high propor-
tion for performing arts institutions. Early music is therefore a particularly interesting case
with which to take up once again the classic cultural economics question: How is it that per-
forming arts institutions seem condemned to catch to cost disease? By reconstructing the usual
ensemble trajectory, we can follow step by step how the deficit deepens.
The case of early music ensembles presents an additional advantage. Studies of the question
generally proceed on the basis of an opposition between two modes for financing artistic activ-
ity, the public and market varieties (Dupuis, 1990). The assumption is that the public authori-
ties have been taking performing arts companies under their wing since time immemorial with-
out ever requiring them to practice sound business management, whereas market-driven
funding is understood as either a new paradigm that these organizations should comply with
in order to be more effective, one that would enable them to cancel their deficits, or a constant
danger that could cause them to disappear because they are not turning a profit. I propose to
explain the origin of cultural institution deficits not by opposing market and public forms of
regulation, but by showing that what forces young, developing performing arts companies to
run a deficit is instead a combination of competition dynamics and public subsidies. In this
respect, the world of early music is an extremely valuable example. As I have shown (Fran-
çois, 2004), early music ensembles have to engage continuously in market transactions to pro-
duce their performances. All early music ensemble activity, from the way the work is orga-
nized (hiring of single-contract rather than permanent-contract musicians) to performance
scheduling (occasional collaboration with concert organizers) involves market relations. YetTable 1
Public
subsidies
(%)
Sponsor-
ship/Patronage
(%)
Own receipts
(%)
Total
(millions
of francs)
Les Arts Florissants 18.2 10.9 70.9 27.5
Chapelle Royale 42.4 0 57.6 16.5
Ensemble Baroque de Limoges 45.7 0 54.3 7
Talens Lyriques 7.8 21.9 70.3 3.2
Seminario Musicale 20 10 70 1.85
Musiciens du Louvre, Grenoble 38.9 0 61.1 18
Concert Spirituel 50 11.1 38.9 4.5
Table constructed on the basis of indications from ensemble managers. Total budget is in millions of francs
(1€ = 6.56 francs).
despite the practical relevance of the market regulation mode, these ensembles are systemati-
cally in the red, surviving only thanks to support from public authorities. We therefore cannot
determine either the origin of ensemble need or the impact of subsidies using the
state-vs.-the-market opposition.
I first review briefly the major models that have been developed to explain the chronic def-
icit of performing arts institutions, assessing their relevance for the early music case and show-
ing that they do not suffice to explain the deepening financial needs of these ensembles. This
leads me to propose a new model to supplement Baumol’s, while specifying the mechanisms
by which cost disease is transmitted.
2. Return to Baumol’s law
Baumol and Bowen (1966) were the first to try to explain the cost disease that seems to hit
all performing arts institutions. Their model applies to the long-term and was designed to work
at the macroeconomic level. They distinguish between two economic sectors, one character-
ized by increasing productivity (A), the other by a constant productivity level (B). Wage levels
in the two sectors evolve similarly: sector B indexes its wage patterns on sector A’s, which
means that sector B’s/N’s payroll costs increase while its productivity does not. Sector B thus
falls further and further into the red.
Because Baumol’s model shows that the deficit is due not to bad management but the in-
evitability of divergent sectoral growth, it was soon seized on by art world actors as a kind of
heaven-sent justification of their situation.3 Early music actors were no exception, as shown in
the following comments from this theater director:
It is Baumol’s law. A watchmaker needed 2 months to make a watch, whereas Molière
needed eight actors to do a play. Now you still need eight actors to do the play, but Swatch
will make you the watch in 30 s. It is not inflationist logic per se. Costs go up, but the re-
ceipts do not increase proportionally. “That’s what state aid is there for” (interview, June
16, 1999).
We have to be somewhat wary of hasty invocations of Baumol’s law used to explain, and
thereby justify, the tendency of early music institutions to run a deficit. This model does not
explain why those institutions’ deficits increase. The mechanisms identified by Baumol and
Bowen to explain transmission of cost disease are operative only in the long-term, not in the
short or medium term. The fact that an archaic sector indexes its wages on those in advancing
sectors is not likely to bring about a major gap in the short-term. It is only in the long-term,
after several decades, that the gap becomes such that deficits come to threaten archaic institu-
tions’ very existence.
All attempts to verify Baumol’s model consider long-term situations, beginning with the
one done by Baumol and Bowen themselves. These authors analyzed payroll cost evolution
(in Broadway theaters and symphonic orchestras, for example) over a 35-year-period and con-2 In this article I start with the principle that deficit corresponds to the level of non-market receipts. This raises the
question of whether subsidies create the deficit or follow it. In any case, an ensemble with a deficit that can not man-
age to find subsidies is doomed either to disappear or go into deep freeze.
3 Cleverly, cruelly, and very carefully, Jorge Palma has noted the many instances of discrepancy between econo-
mists’ discourse and how it is appropriated by actors in the French art world to justify their situation (Palma, 1990).
cert cost (New York and Cincinnati orchestras) over a 120-year period.4 Dominique Leroy’s
verification for the French case (Leroy, 1980) covers the period from 1860 to the 1970s. It
would thus seem that Marianne Felton’s conclusion in her (Felton, 1990) study of the Louis-
ville, Kentucky orchestra is generalizable: Baumol’s law is validated only if we reason in the
long-term. In the case of many early music ensembles, the deficit sets in much earlier. They
catch cost disease after only a few years in existence, sometimes only a few months—the pro-
ductivity differential does not have time to widen before they fall “ill.” To account for early
music ensemble deficits, then, we have to leave aside Baumol and Bowen’s model, at least
temporarily, and look for other mechanisms that could explain the ensembles’ situation.3. Deliberately running a deficit?The above-mentioned limitations of Baumol and Bowen’s model are not specific to early
music. Studies done in the 1970s and 1980s from a free-market perspective showed that the
supposed “deficit inevitability” that performing arts companies succumbed to was perhaps not
as inevitable as the two American economists had claimed. These studies were inspired by
economic analysis of bureaucracy (Buchanan, 1968; Tullock, 1978), and they refocused the
problem in two ways, considering it a matter of micro rather than macroeconomics, and under-
standing deficit not as an unavoidable effect of divergent economic dynamics but the result of
a deliberate strategy. These studies began with the hypothesis that there was little oversight of
cultural enterprise managers. The consumer arrived on the scene only after production and he
only paid part of the cost of the service received; he therefore had less of a say than if he were
paying the whole price. And the state subsidizing institution, which intervened before produc-
tion, could not efficiently oversee the cultural enterprise because such enterprises have a
monopoly over information about their costs, and their products are prototypical, meaning that
production functions are difficult to determine. The weakening of oversight and control both
upstream and downstream of production meant that managers had near-complete budget dis-
cretion. Budget funds could be used to three ends: increasing production (increased quantity
strategy), improving program quality (increased quality strategy) or spending more liberally
on the different factors of production (additional costs strategy).5
Part of the deficit of institutions specialized in early music is indeed due to the strategies
followed by their managers. Three types of practices may be likened to the “deliberate strate-
gies” described in these models. The first involves the fact that when early music ensembles
start out, they are made up of amateurs. They can be said to have professionalized themselves
in that the actors’ skills did not necessarily exist at the outset but were constructed as the early
music movement developed. The managers of these ensembles invented their job; at the outset,
their activity was not really comparable to any other in the music world at the time. Learning
by doing was no smooth process; the history of early music ensembles is marked with mana-
ging errors that may have threatened an ensemble’s survival and in any case put the company
into the red. During its first years of existence, Les Arts Florissants had several managers
whose skill was not up to the company’s ambitions, as a former manager recounts:4 See Baumol and Bowen (1966), pp. 190 and 218.
5 For further discussion of these various scenarios and applications of them, see Grampp (1989); Dupuis (1983);
Frey and Pommerehne (1993).
The blunders were small at first, but they ended up making big ones. They were in the red
for Charpentier’s Médée—for the CD in particular. They never recouped their outlay, and they
still had to pay the costs. Later, the deficit produced its own deficit: we had to pay the artists
and suppliers, so we were not paying the social insurance contributions, and there were penal-
ties, etc. That was under A’s management—though she was not entirely responsible for it—
and they started pushing her toward the door during her second pregnancy. Then Christie put
up the person who was his personal secretary at the time. B.B. had lots of fine qualities but he
had never learned this business. He made serious mistakes: drew up a balanced budget but left
out the VAT. He stuck to his budget, so in the end he was obviously losing money. He was a
really good person, but he just did not know. From the moment he got there, things got expo-
nentially worse. He was in charge until late 1985; they called me in to the rescue in late 1986.
My first job was to estimate the deficit—no one had any idea what it amounted to. When I got
there on September 1, 1986, they had not even done the accounts for 1985 (interview, June 15,
1999).
While deepening deficit may result from amateurism, it can also result from a deliberate
strategy on the part of ensembles hoping for financial support from public authorities who for
their part are not eager to help institutions that seem to be managing to survive on their own
resources but are willing to intervene to prevent them from disappearing altogether. This strat-
egy amounts to keeping the ensemble’s financial situation unbalanced enough to make inter-
vention either desirable or necessary, without leaving oneself open to overt criticism for bad
management. Attaining such a “balance” is a delicate, risky undertaking, as a manager ex-
plains:
The idea was to juggle it all so that at the end of the year we could present a balanced
budget, or just a slight deficit, to the administrative board—which included musical director
representatives—so that they would increase our subsidies for the following year. Without
going so far as to drive trucks around to use up the gas, which is what they are rumored to
do in the army, we wanted to be able to say, “That’s how it is, and we had like 100 or 200
thousand francs more next year to run the ensemble” (interview, June 25, 1999).
This outright “deficit strategy” is not just a wild gamble. Early music ensembles are an in-
tegral part of the music world in France and represent some of the finest successes the music
world at large has known in the last 20 years. If the Musiciens du Louvre or Les Arts Floris-
sants were to disappear, this would cause a great stir in the music world. Public authorities or
patrons can decide to intervene to avoid negative publicity.
In more systematic terms, we can say that it would be hard for institutions specialized in
early music to proceed as if they were not betting on getting financial resources that in fact
they are not sure to obtain. Like all music institutions, early music ensembles set up their sche-
dules several years in advance. They often have to invest to get their programs realized, redu-
cing program sale price and taking on part of the deficit directly themselves. In doing so they
are acting in anticipation of the funding that state and local authorities will allot them. In most
cases, however, and particularly where the state is concerned, these sums are redetermined
each year, and the ensembles are not told the amount they will receive until the last quarter.
They are thus faced with a delicate choice: they can either cease their activities while waiting
for state subsidies, or act in anticipation of renewed or increased subsidies and thereby put
themselves into an extremely precarious situation. Clearly, the deficit strategy reflects more
than a willingness to gamble on the part of ensemble managers; it pertains to the disconnection
between ensemble receipts and ensemble expenses. The subsidy allocation schedule and the
cash investment required are such that they are likely to create a high deficit in the long-
term.
Amateurism, gamble-taking behavior, temporal disconnection between receipts and ex-
penses—and management strategies, another possible cause of deficits. However, none of this
explains what makes the deficit dynamic necessary. Clearly in each of the cases just described
ensembles made a deliberate choice, but such strategies are risky: the public authorities may
very well decide not to cancel the ensemble’s deficit, judging it to be due to poor manage-
ment. This means that at least some managers probably will not adopt such a strategy, particu-
larly if their ensembles do not have the kind of renown that might ensure success. And yet the
histories of the different ensembles clearly show that the shift from amateur to professional
status always goes with an increase in funding needs and that ensemble growth never goes
with a balanced budget. Once again, how are we to understand this inevitability? What me-
chanisms cause these ensembles to catch cost disease?
4. The professionalization model
4.1. The argument
I will try to demonstrate that these mechanisms are related to two characteristics of early
music ensembles: first, they have to be competitive on two markets simultaneously; second,
they are engaged in a process of professionalization. These characteristics explain why they
are inevitably in the red. It should be recalled what it is involved in preparing early music con-
certs. An ensemble decides to put on a particular program; it assembles the musicians and has
them rehearse; it finds engagements with publicists and bills the publicists part of production
costs, namely, concert cost (musicians’ fees, etc.), rehearsal cost, musicians’ expenses, and
structural costs. Overhead costs are usually paid for with revenues other than concert sales,
but concerts usually have to pay for themselves.
Early music ensembles use the services of freelance musicians hired by single program con-
tract and must therefore offer wages likely to attract and keep them. Here they are of course in
competition with each other—an ensemble cannot hope to obtain the services of the best mu-
sicians if it offers half of the fee other ensembles are offering. But they are also in competition
with the other employers of the music world. Before the late 1970s, very few musicians played
early instruments and even fewer made a living at it. For most, early music was a hobby or
passion; in no case was it the musicians’ main source of income. This situation gradually
changed over the 1980s. Top quality musicians came to be attracted by this labor market,
which offered many opportunities. But ensembles can only attract these musicians if they pay
them a fee not far below that proposed by traditional structures. Fees for musicians specialized
in early music are not downwardly elastic/show a low degree of downward elasticity.
Early music ensembles could perhaps stay in the black if the only constraint was integration
into the musician market. Their difficulties arise from the fact that they are simultaneously
caught up in another market, the concert market. Here they are once again in competition with
traditional structures, which are subsidized heavily enough not to have to charge concert orga-
nizers cost price; they thus pass on only a small part of cost to organizers. At first the early
music world was made up of amateurs: ensembles had low or nonexistent fixed expenses and
their musicians were paid only modest fees; they could offer highly competitive prices for their
productions. But when their personnel turned professional and their costs began to rise, they
got caught up in a competition game that makes it impossible for them to bargain on the basis
of internal budget constraints.
Because they are necessarily implicated in both musician and concert markets, early music
ensembles have only one variable they can adjust: their deficit. They cannot offer concert
prices that would keep them competitive by substantially lowering musician fee level; if they
did, they would not be able to hire the best instrumentalists. Nor can they obtain high enough
prices from organizers to be able to balance their budgets; if they charged high prices, their
only possible customers would be a few heavily endowed instititutions—which would have
to want to hire them. The professionalization dynamic allowed early music ensembles to
penetrate the market without being subsidized, but in order to stay there they have to be able
to compete at least minimally with heavily subsidized conventional structures. In sum, their
survival depends on their accepting—and managing—a deficit. Clearly the mechanisms by
which cost disease is transmitted are not those identified by Baumol and Bowen. What ex-
plains the fact that cost disease—which traditional musical institutions are already “infected”
with—gets transmitted to early music ensembles are the market mechanism and the competi-
tion game.
4.2. The model
The above argument can be substantiated by means of a simple mathematical formalization
and examples from my survey of early music ensembles. The model should allow first of all to
stylize actor behavior on the different markets, which in turn will allow for specifying which
variables they can act on as well as the mechanisms that work to deepen the deficit. In other
words, the model should allow for clarifying the reasoning and transposing it to other perform-
ing arts sectors. But the point of the model is also to facilitate dialogue with economists. The
problematics of sociologists and economists working on the performing arts partially overlap.
Economists are willing to do empirical study and test their models on historical data, and
sociologists have come to recognize their own concerns in the inquiries initially formulated
by economists. However, this common ground is worked unequally: economists model actors’
behavior, but sociologists make little attempt to translate their field results formally. It is not
my intention to enter into the epistemological debates on the use of formal models in econom-
ics and sociology.6 My point is simply that the schemata I have just described are easily
formalizable, and providing a formalized version of the argument improves conditions for
interdisciplinary dialogue. My procedure remains sociological in that it is based not on a
deductive approach that models behaviors on the basis of a predetermined set of hypotheses,
like economists do, but rather an inductive practice of stylizing empirically observed
behavior.7
To simplify the reasoning, I hypothesize that the costs of managing early music ensembles
are covered by subsidies from public authorities and patrons but that those subsidies do not
cover artistic expenses. I calculate for one concert only; total deficit over 1 year would be
reached by calculating the sum of deficits for all concerts given in that year.6 On these points see, among others, Hirsch et al. (1987); Grenier et al. (2001).
7 On inductive and deductive uses of modeling see Chiappori (2001); Hirsch et al. (1987).
4.2.1. Defining early music ensemble deficits
An ensemble has two resources for financing a concert: concert selling price and the deficit
itself. This can be written
C1 ¼ P1 þ D1 (1)
where
C1 = concert cost,
P1 = concert sale price,
D1 = deficit created by concert.
Concert cost may be brought down to payroll cost, since musicians provide the instruments
and are solely responsible for instrument purchase and upkeep. Payroll cost is broken down
into concert cost strictly speaking, i.e. sum of fees paid individually to musicians for their con-
cert performance, and share of rehearsal cost to be absorbed by sale of the concert to
organizers.8 The musicians hired to perform the program are brought together for a few days
of paid rehearsal; in general the fee for a day’s rehearsal is equal to the fee for one concert.
General rehearsal cost is then spread out among the different programmers that buy the concert
(concert halls, music festivals). If the ensemble only sells its concert to two programmers, re-
hearsal cost will be divided up between them; if it manages to set up a 10-concert tour, rehear-
sal cost is spread among the 10 programmers. This may be written
C1 ¼ L1W1 þ a1L1W1 (2)
C1 ¼ L1W1ð1þ a1Þwhere
L1 = number of musicians,
W1 = pay for each unit of work for a concert, i.e., fee,
a1 = r1/c1,
r1 = number of rehearsal fees, c1 = number of concerts in the tour.
Eq. (1) may therefore be rewritten
P1 þ D1 ¼ L1W1ð1þ a1Þ
from which it follows that
P1 ¼ L1W1ð1þ a1Þ  D1 (3)
Early music ensembles will therefore try to sell their productions on the concert market at
price P1. On this market they are in competition with other early music ensembles, which are
not very highly subsidized either, and with traditional orchestras made up of permanent-
contract musicians. In other words, the level of subsidies these orchestras receive allows them
to finance their management needs and a substantial part of their artistic expenses. Here we
will estimate that subsidies cover β of traditional orchestra’s artistic expenses. Concert sale
price, then, has to cover 1 – β, that is α, of payroll cost for the concert.8 Musicians’ expenses have not been included here. They vary roughly proportionally to fees, meaning this analysis
would not be fundamentally changed if they were taken into account.
What is payroll cost for a traditional orchestra concert? As mentioned, these orchestras em-
ploy a permanent staff of musicians who are paid in exchange for a certain number of hours
per month (or a certain number of 3-hour “services,” depending on the institution). To simpli-
fy, we can say that W2 is wages paid to a musician for 3 hours’ work in a traditional orchestra,
what we will call these orchestras’ “fee equivalent.”
This means that
P2 ¼ αL2W2ð1þ a2Þ (4)
where
α = 1 – β,
β = subsidy level for a traditional orchestra,
P2 = traditional orchestra concert price,
L2 = number of orchestra musicians,
W2 = amount paid for a service or “fee equivalent”,
a2 = r2/c2,
r2 = number of rehearsals, c2 = number of concerts.
The hypothesis is that early music ensembles have to compete on two markets: the concert
and labor markets. This hypothesis has two implications:
● On the labor market, wage level for early music musicians has to be equal to that for tradi-
tional musicians. In other words:
W1 ¼ W2 ¼ W (5)
● On the concert market, early music concert prices have to be close to those for traditional
ensembles. In other words:
P1 ¼ P2 ¼ P (6)
These two hypotheses enable us to determine the deficit level for early music ensembles.
From Eq. (6) (condition for a balanced budget on the concert market), it follows that
L1W1ð1þ a1Þ  D1 ¼ αL2W2ð1þ a2Þ
or
D1 ¼ L1W1ð1þ a1Þ  αL2W2ð1þ a2Þ
Given Eq. (5) (condition for a balanced budget on the labor market), it follows that
D1 ¼ W½L1ð1þ a1Þ  αL2ð1þ a2Þ (7)
These are the conditions under which an early music ensemble can balance its budgets. We
can now examine the nature of competition on the two markets.
4.2.2. Competition on the market for musicians
Early music ensembles could eliminate their deficit if they paid nothing to the musicians
they work with; this can readily be checked using Eq. (7). Indeed, this is what amateur status
means: when ensembles first come into existence, concerts are irregular, musicians are not
paid systematically, management is on a volunteer basis or handled by the musical director—
as a violist playing in Paris cafés in the late 1970s explains:
We played in a really nice place called the Vieille Grille, a café in the fifth arrondissement.
Every Monday evening they gave little concerts. People consumed and we played. The people
who came were pretty much early music fanatics. In fact the boss had teamed up with an
instrument-maker. We did not know anything about that. We were doing what we wanted to
be doing and having a good time. It was not always great quality, of course (interview, June 1,
1999).
As the movement became more successful, the musicians became more demanding; they
began devoting all their time to early music, and asking for higher pay. Professional musi-
cians, attracted by the work possibilities that these ensembles represented for them, started
playing early instruments and making wage demands that were no longer those of the move-
ment pioneers.
In this respect, the newcomers’ situation substantially changed as the movement became
professionalized. An ensemble created in the early 1980s had few competitors; working condi-
tions for musicians specialized in early music had not yet stabilized; and it was still possible to
get musicians playing in the main baroque ensembles to collaborate occasionally for free with
another one. In the late 1990s, however, a new ensemble could only hope to penetrate what
had now become a highly competitive market if the productions it had to offer were of excel-
lent musical quality. Consequently, musicians wishing to develop their ensemble’s activity had
to hire professional musicians, less ready to sacrifice their fee than in the days when everyone
was an amateur. Fairly quickly the new ensembles had to offer musicians’ wages comparable
to those offered by better-known ensembles and traditional orchestras.
Clearly the mechanisms for transmitting cost disease identified here are different from those
discussed by Baumol and Bowen. The mechanism is indeed one of indexation, but it does not
come into play for archaic vs. progressive economic sectors but between two segments of a
single labor market. What is decisive here is competition between a subsidized segment and a
non-subsidized one. Still, if this were the only competition ground, the ensembles could com-
pensate for the wage increase by increasing their intake, i.e. selling their concerts for more.
The problem is that they also have to be competitive on the concert market.4.2.3. Competition on the concert market
In what way does the imperative of competing on the concert market imply new constraints
for early music ensembles? To specify those constraints, we need to distinguish between se-
dentary and touring traditional orchestras.4.2.3.1. Traditional orchestra on tour. When a traditional orchestra is on tour, the number of
same-program concerts is the same as for an early music ensemble: both types of musical en-
sembles rehearse 3 days, then start on a 12-concert tour. Rehearsal cost is thus spread out over
the same number of concerts.
In other words
a1 ¼ a2
We know that D1 = 0 if
L1ð1þ a1Þ ¼ αL2ð1þ a2Þ (8)
Therefore, D1 = 0 if:
L1 ¼ αL2
In order for the early music ensemble to have 0 deficit when competing with a traditional
orchestra on tour, it has to be able to sell a much smaller production than a traditional orches-
tra program. The subsidy level for traditional orchestras is around 80% in continental Europe
and the United States, so α = 20%.9 In order for an early music ensemble to organize a concert
without running a deficit, the number of its musicians can amount to no more than 20% of the
number of traditional orchestra musicians. In other words, if the concert organizers agree to
buy a 10-musician early music concert for the same price as a symphonic concert, then the
early music concert can stay out of the red. This situation does occasionally occur; the reputa-
tion of some ensembles is such that they manage to sell very expensive productions at cost
price.10 They may also be the only ones to offer a certain type of repertoire, and organizers
may be willing to pay more given this monopoly.
Usually, however, organizers refuse to swap a symphonic concert for a chamber music con-
cert, so ensembles have to be willing to increase their deficit to sell their productions. An ad-
minstrator speaks in these terms of the difficulty he had selling Les Arts Florissants produc-
tions at cost in the United States. To further develop its activity, the ensemble had to be
willing to lose money on tour:
When we decided to attack the United States, we decided we would do it every year, not
regardless of price, but with a controlled deficit determined in advance. I was convinced we
would have to subsidize our first American tours—and I do not think it went off so badly. I
did not see how we could come out even. I knew the cost of the concerts, the necessary
expenses, the travel expenses. I did not see how we could sell the concerts for that price,
for utterly esoteric repertoires. You go see an American programmer—even if you do it
through your agent, who is not exactly up on everything himself—you go see him with a
program of music by Joseph Pignolet de Montéclair—just imagine the looks you get. Wil-
liam Christie was unknown in the US at the time, and you could not say the singers were
stars (Interview, July 6, 1999).
Moreover, the more successful ensembles become, the bigger the productions they program.
Ensembles’ careers in this respect follow that of their musical directors. When the ensemble is
founded, the musicians are willing to specialize in a small repertoire that remains outside tradi-
tional repertoire turf. But later they are led to take up a more “traditional” repertoire; i.e. the9 See François (1998).
10 This is particularly true of certain English baroque orchestras. Failing to obtain subsidies, they have been forced
to sell their productions at cost price. Recording is often their first activity because their productions are too expen-
sive to find buyers.
classic and Romantic symphonic repertoire, and above all opera. Now they can no longer play
on size effect to balance their budget, and early music concerts will necessarily be unable to
pay for themselves. When traditional orchestras and early music ensembles are the same size
and both are on tour, the ensembles cannot come out even. To be competitive, they have to
accept a deficit. Once again, everything is played out in the competition between subsidized
orchestras and newcomers to the market. This also comes through when we detail the mechan-
isms at work for an traditional orchestra that stays put.4.2.3.2. Sedentary traditional orchestra. France’s traditional orchestras seldom go on tour. The
Plan Landowski, which instituted and now provides the funding regulations for most French
traditional orchestras, also specifies their mission: they are to ensure music diffusion for a par-
ticular locale, usually either a city or région.11 They do go on tour once a year, but most of
their productions are performed in the same place, often in the same concert hall. Between
1996 and 1998, two-thirds of Orchestre National de France concerts took place in Paris
whereas from 1988 to 1997, Les Arts Florissants performed only 13% of their concerts in the
capital and 13% in Basse-Normandie, though this région was their main sponsor.12 Staying
put has implications for recouping rehearsal costs. Obviously a traditional orchestra performing
its concerts in a single venue has to change its programs more often than an early music en-
semble performing the same program in different cities. In general, sedentary traditional or-
chestras give two performances of each program they prepare, whereas early music tours com-
prise between 6 and 12 concerts, depending on the ensemble.13 Clearly when the traditional
orchestra stays put, the number of concerts it can give for one program is below that which
an early music ensemble gives for the same number of rehearsals.
How can an early music ensemble come out even when it is competing with sedentary or-
chestras? Once again, there are two cases, depending on whether the two groups are the same
or different sizes.
● Groups of the same size:
As shown, D1 = 0 if
L1ð1þ a1Þ ¼ αL2ð1þ a2Þ (9)
If the early music ensemble has to offer productions that are the same size as a traditional
orchestra’s at the same price level—in other words, if L1 = L2, then Eq. (8) becomes
1þ a1 ¼ αð1þ a2Þ
So it comes that
α ¼ ð1þ a1Þ=ð1þ a2Þ11 Traditional musical institutions are sedentarized across Europe and in North America, meaning that the competi-
tion which French ensembles are up against takes approximately the same form in France as abroad.
12 On the Orchestre National de France see François (1999); on Les Arts Florissants, François (2004).
13 Between 1996 and 1998, Orchestre National programs were given an average of 1.5 times; Arts Florissants pro-
grams, an average of 5.5 times.
It follows that
β ¼ 1 ½ð1þ a1Þ=ð1þ a2Þ
In other words, the early music ensemble will be in the red as soon as
α < ð1þ a1Þ=ð1þ a2Þ
i.e. if
β > 1 ½ð1þ a1Þ=ð1þ a2Þ
or if
β > ½rðc1  c2Þ=½c1ðc2 þ rÞ
On this basis it can be shown that ensemble deficits necessarily deepen as ensembles go
professional. Obviously they have no means of affecting the level of subsidies received by tra-
ditional orchestras (b) or those orchestras’ diffusion strategy (a2). The assumption here is also
that they cannot affect orchestra size or their own size either. This means they can play on
only two variables, both of which determine the value of a1: number of rehearsals and number
of concerts.
In the beginning, while they are trying to switch from amateur to professional status, en-
sembles have simply no means of affecting these variables. Professionalization necessarily
goes along with increased rehearsal time: the desired status change implies improvement of
production quality and therefore more rehearsals, though the number of concerts they will be
able to sell remains uncertain given how little known they are. An organizer expresses this im-
perative very clearly when he explains that he cannot program “telephone concerts”:
Once I said to an ensemble that I won’t name, “Look, I really want to support you, we
are doing a project together this year and maybe we will be able to reinvite you next year.
But I really want you to work—it can not be a telephone concert you arrange just like that.”
The next year I say to them, “This year we can redo the concert in Geneva.” So we do it in
Geneva. But they are not at all the same people. The musicians have been completely re-
shuffled, not the same musicians at all because those ones were not available. So I went to
see the person in charge and I told him “This is not what we said. What I am interested in
is having a team of young French singers who work on the same repertoire together and
deepen it. Doing a telephone concert where you call each other up and get together 5 days
beforehand, you rehearse three times and then do the concert—I am not interested.” So he
says, “But they had started in on something else. You understand, they have got to make a
living, and I could not hold them to it. I took musicians who were available at the same
time.” That’s the big problem in baroque music, it has to involve sacrifices at the start,
and people have to buckle down to regular, thorough work without being sure they are
going to be able to sell three or four little concerts. “….That’s the way the chamber music
spirit works, there’s ensemble stability, you really get the repertoires down and then you
take them to the audience” (Interview, December 15, 1999).
Given this state of affairs, the move from amateur to professional status at first involves in-
creasing a1, and therefore increasing the ensemble’s deficit. Once they have gotten over this
first hurdle, ensembles have two possible strategies for diminishing a1. The first may be called
a business strategy: they try to compete on price. In this case they lower the number of rehear-
sals, which immediately affects the value of a1. In the medium term, however, production
quality tends to fall, the ensemble sells fewer and fewer concerts, and a1, which began by
going down, starts upward again. The opposite of the business strategy is the reputation strat-
egy, where the ensemble works to compete on the basis of quality. In this case it decides to
rehearse a great deal so as to improve the quality of its concerts. At first, a1 is likely to in-
crease and the deficit to deepen, as explained by an ensemble manager:
We rehearse a lot. This explains why we are relatively expensive, namely compared with
foreign ensembles, the English in particular, who do not rehearse much. For a concert pro-
gram that does not involve staging, if it’s a composite program we rehearse 4 or 5 days. If
it’s an opera, which can last from 2 to 4 hours, that’s something else again. Usually you
need to do a good week’s worth of work with the soloists and the continuo and 5 or 6 days
with the orchestra before leaving on tour. For some Italian opera projects, where there is a
great deal of recitative, there can be 10-day rehearsal periods with soloists and continuo.
We often have to work with singers who do not know the repertoire at all, and you need
time to teach them how to sing this music. You need to work at a slower pace than in en-
sembles working on a repertoire the company knows (interview, June 17, 1999).
Later perhaps, once the ensemble has established a reputation for itself, it can increase the
number of concerts for each program. Then a1 decreases and the deficit can start downwards.
So while an ensemble’s deficit necessarily deepens as it turns professional, success over the
long-term can reduce the deficit. An ensemble that is just starting out can not necessarily multi-
ply outlets for its productions, whereas a successful ensemble is one that can set up long tours.
The more renowned it is, the greater the number of organizers who will want to program it.
● Different-sized groups:
We know that D1 = 0 if
L1ð1þ a1Þ ¼ αL2ð1þ a2Þ (10)
We now suppose that an organizer is willing to pay the same price for productions of dif-
ferent sizes (size of course varies by production seller, either an early music ensemble or a tra-
ditional orchestra). What does the ratio of early music production size to traditional orchestra
production size have to be for the ensemble to come out even? From Eq. (8) it follows that
L1=L2 ¼ α½ð1þ a2Þ=ð1þ a1Þ
We know that the subsidy level for traditional orchestras is 80%. This means that an early
music ensemble that manages to program long tours for itself will be able to balance its budget
if it manages to sell productions using a number of musicians amounting to 53% of traditional
orchestra size. For an ensemble that only manages to perform its production six times, that
production can only employ 40% of the number of musicians in a traditional orchestra if it
wants to come out in the black. In other words, early music ensembles will have to offer pro-
ductions half or less than half the size of a traditional orchestra’s at the same price.
5. Conclusion
The professionalization process that early music ensembles are caught up in implies that
when they turn professional they have no way to impact on two variables that, as amateurs,
they used to be able to adjust: wages paid to musicians and price they can sell their concerts
for. Both these variables depend on market balances that these ensembles can affect only mar-
ginally. An assumption of the model presented here is that in competing with subsidized insti-
tutions, the ensembles can play on only two other variables: size of productions offered for
sale to concert organizers, and rehearsal/concert ratio. The fact is that turning professional
leads ensembles to make choices with regard to these variables that do not help them cancel
their deficit. Few organizers are willing to pay the same amount for a chamber music ensemble
as they would pay for a symphonic orchestra. Moreover, musical directors’ careers push them
to develop their ensemble via symphonic and opera productions; the ensemble therefore cannot
benefit from any size effect. The rehearsal/concert ratio, meanwhile, has to be reduced as
much as possible, meaning that ensemble’s maneuvering room decreases proportionally with
professionalization: they cannot reduce number of rehearsals without the risk of hurting pro-
duction quality, and they very seldom manage to get a high number of concerts out of a single
program. The model presented here, based on the particular case of early music, seems gener-
alizable, with appropriate modifications, to performing arts domains that present the same fun-
damental characteristics. Early music is not the only art sector where newcomers are likely to
find themselves competing with subsidized institutions on two markets simultaneously.
Baumol’s model does not in itself suffice to explain the deficit dynamic. What it presents as
the mechanisms (indexing of archaic-sector wages on advancing-sector wages) and the driving
force (productivity differential) are not those actually at work in the situation of new market
players. The mechanisms that transmit imbalance are rather the ones identified here concerning
competition on the labor and concert markets. And what upsets the balance is not a long-term
productivity differential but a short-term dynamic characterized by different levels of subsidies
for the two segments of a single market: firmly established institutions on the one hand, new-
comers on the other. Clearly the professionalization model cited here supplements more than it
takes the place of Baumol’s model. Though it enables us to understand how the deficit ten-
dency is transmitted to newcomers, it does not answer the question of where established insti-
tutions’ deficits come from. It is likely that when newcomers manage to obtain stable yearly
subsidies, they find themselves in the same position as the traditional institutions were in when
they began to penetrate the market; they then pass “cost disease” on to the new newcomers.
Still, we need to understand why firmly established institutions cannot balance their budgets
in such a way as to prevent deficits from happening in the first place. It is on this point that
Baumol and Bowen’s arguments become fully relevant once again. Artists’ human capital is
not related to their productivity, which is marginal, but wage level is determined proportion-
ally to the former rather than the latter. Art performance receipts are upwardly inelastic, as
much because of what characterizes demand for these goods—pronounced price elasticity—
as because of policy arguments in favor of maintaining the economic conditions-of-possibility
for cultural democratization. In other words, economic balance for performing arts institutions
is defined by a two-part mechanism: newcomers index prices and wages on those of firmly
established institutions; in the long-term, these institutions’ balance is affected by the upward
pull of wages caused by ricochet by productivity increases in the advanced sector. These two
balance-determining mechanisms (the archaic sector in relation to the advanced one, newco-
mers in relation to established institutions) correspond to two reasoning scales (macroeco-
nomic and microeconomic) and two constraint transmission time-scales (long-term and short-
term).
Lastly, the state regulation/market regulation opposition on which bureaucracy theory mod-
els are based is clearly not relevant here. Bureaucratic decision-making procedures and lack of
oversight are not the point. What causes newcomers to catch cost disease is the combination of
public funding and market regulation. It is because traditional orchestras are subsidized that
they can simultaneously offer high wages to their musicians and low prices to concert organi-
zers. But competition mechanisms are what “ensure” that these constraints get transmitted to
early music ensembles.
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